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ABSTRACT 
The ability to grow market share in a saturated market is often difficult if that 
market is stable. In a country that has an economy that is not performing, 
growth of a company is often vital so as to allow the prosperity of a company. 
One such way to grow is for the company to form strategic alliances with other 
companies that are strong where the other company is week and in so doing 
stimulate a competitive advantage. 
In retail store outlets and location play an important role in competitive 
advantage by creating" new markets" , and if these new markets could 
increase the companies existing market share, then this results in a win - win 
situation for the company. Often moving into new markets involves risks as it 
is the unknown. 
By making a move to sell product in two pilot project Woolworths- Engen 
forecourt stores, Woolworths are moving into a market where they can sell a 
product group HMR's (home meal replacements) where currently they have 
no close competitors , thus capitalizing. This move is heralded However as 
this is a totally new format of selling, Woolworths need to ascertain if brand 
integrity will be affected and whether such a project is more than just a good 
idea. 
It was found the NPV's and IRR's ( the way Woolworths evaluate projects and 
project feasibility) from a Woolworths perspective were both extremely 
positive. From Engen's position, this initiative brought about a substantial 
increase in both petroleum and food store sales for the two pilot projects, 
comparable with those figures prior to the pilot projects launch. 
Woolworths as a company were very interested in the qualitative results 
conducted by an independent consultant, as they were concerned about 
maintaining brand integrity. This fear was not founded as the survey done by 
actual customers shopping the pilot project stores show that customer 
confidence over Woolworths brand integrity was not affected. Instead 
customers enjoyed the convenience. 
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The strength of this Alliance is that both members have brought to the part 
aspects where the other member currently does not perform. Woolworths 
bring their good food and strong brand name linked with market dominance 
and Engen bring their immense outlet network, and prime locations. I.e. the 
strategic fit between these two corporates is extremely strong. All parties 
involved in this venture namely Woolworths, Engen Head Office and the 
petroleum station dealer benefit financially from this initiative. 
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The world of retail is a cutthroat business showing great inelasticity to the 
economy and spending power of the consumer. In South Africa, the retail 
industry is a relatively saturated industry with a fair percentage of customer 
loyalty being driven by convenience and price/value. As the majority of retailers 
are posting losses at the end of the previous financial years (2000, 2001 , 2002), 
there is a constant battle between retailers to gain market share from each other. 
Retailers that traditionally have served the upper tier LSM groups face the 
biggest challenge in respect to gaining market share in South Africa under its 
current economical conditions . One such blue chip retailer is Woolworths, whose 
management have risen to the challenge by searching for new niche or existing 
markets that they can enter into. 
Woolworths currently enjoys majority market share in the convenience meal or 
home meal replacement (HMR) market. Bearing this in mind and linking this to 
the customers want for convenience, what if Woolworths offered HMR's and 
convenience in the form of easily accessible long trading hour outlet stores? 
Better still what if Woolworths offered their products at sites where people were 
destined to stop anyway, say at a petrol station. Would this be a feasible venture 
in terms of both qualitative and quantitative (such as brand integrity) factors? 
Would it be sustainable, and which petroleum company should Woolworth's form 
a strategic alliance with? 
If this proved successful not only could this result in a new market, but this could 
also result in greater market share in Woolworths current trading market as these 
stores could capture new customers who because of misconceptions could 
previously not have been exposed to Woolworths product. 
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This study focuses on the Woolworths decision to enter into this new market 
segment and tries to identify whether this is a profitable sustainable project that 
will give the company the long term edge over its competitors, and how best to 
set th is up with a petroleum company such as Engen. 
1.2 Background and Context 
In 1999 there were 2330 small outlet stores in South Africa (980 forecourt stalls) 
as opposed to 662 large outlets. Growth in small stores had been tracking at 16 
% per annum as opposed to a 0.1 % decline in large stores. The current small! 
convenience store market is currently estimated at approximately R35 billion, 
with the size of these stores ranging from 65m2 to 250m2. During the same time 
period the growth in forecourts grew by 23%, with 65 % of these forecourt 
customers dedicating themselves to one particular small store. Surveys have 
tended to indicate that customers visit these forecourt stores on average 18 
times per month, with 25% of the customers purchases being non petrol. Surveys 
have also demonstrated that customers regard convenience and value for money 
as the most important reason for choosing a convenience store. If this formula 
could be perfected, the successful party would have an extremely lucrative 
business on their hands. This point is made more prominent by the fact that 80% 
of convenience stores are open 24 hours a day, with the remainder trading from 
06:00hr to 23:00hr. 
Convenience stores in the UK stock between 2500 and 3000 lines, although this 
is extremely large in S.A. terms , a general model can be drawn from this. UK 
stores concentrate mainly on 4 product areas: treats and gifts, top up, HMR and 
news agency. Hot food is also available in 98% of UK convenience stores. Select 
is the fourth largest sandwich retailer in the UK behind Tesco, Boots and M&S. 
Why look at Engen as a potential partner? Engen currently has the largest 
network in S.A. with a 31 % share of the fuel market ( 1450 sites) [35% with the 
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addition of Zennex]. Engen also has the largest convenience network ( 40% ) 
with 372 shops. Engen currently has capital resources in place for projects and 
expansion. In addition Engen have the flexibility for proactive decision making, 
offering a basket of brands and exclusive projects ( e.g. ticket web ). Engen 
currently command a brand equity of R12 Billion . Engen also own the sites with 
the Franchisees paying a rental- hence more control over the end process. 
For this new venture to be a success, Woolworth's brand integrity must be 
maintained, and the correct locations must be chosen for the proposed sites. 
1.3 Motive for the study 
The motive of the study was generated to ascertain if there is merit for a 
company such as Woolworths who operate in a fairly unique sector of the retail 
market to form a strategic alliance with a company that operates in the lower end 
of the market segment . Especially one where retail is a secondary focus, taking 
its energies away from its core business. 
In addition, to ascertain whether the move into this market segment of 
convenience food outlets is feasible (considering both quantitative and qualitative 
variables), with a company such a Woolworths who strength has been built 
around its brand integrity looking at forming an alliance with a petroleum country 
It needs to be tested whether this project is sustainable and not just a good idea 
worth trailing ; and if so how best to set up a structure between these two 
companies? 
In so doing, it is hoped that conclusions drawn from this study can be 
recommended to management, ultimately leading to an increase in market share. 
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1.4. Value of the Study 
There are many components that contribute to the outcome of the Woolworths-
Engen initiative. This study hopes to pull all those components together to 
present a clear picture of the positive ness of such a venture for all parties 
concerned. Often when companies evaluate projects, if the projects responsible 
for driving the project are passionate, they would want to see the project 
succeed. This study hopes to give an unbiased report with conclusions on the 
venture undertaken by Woolworths and Engen 
1.5. Problem Statement 
Traditionally retailers have traded during normal working hours (9 am to 5 pm). 
These limited trading hours have negative consequences for retailers and 
customers and potential customers. For customers; shopping has usually been 
restricted to normal trading hours, making it difficult for customers who hold down 
a 9am to 5pm job to buy merchandise. This is especially the case of people who 
work unusual and/or extended hours for example staff who work on shifts such 
as hospital , shipping and milling staff. From the retailers' perspective, these are 
new customers who potentially have the need for their goods, but do not have 
access to them through factors beyond their control. The challenge for the 
retailer is access. The retailer needs to trial offering this customer access to their 
goods without having to undergo a huge capital investment. 
The retailer is further challenged by what format these goods should be offered 
in to the customer, bearing in mind that convenience is the overriding factor 
determining these customers shopping habits. Lastly, will such a venture bring 
financial reward or will it result in a "white elephant" scenario. Is it feasible for 
Woolworths to move away from trading in traditional stores and traditional trading 
hours, to one of convenience, where a product is traded twenty four hours a day? 
Will sell ing products from a forecourt store be sustainable in the long term, both 
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from a brand integrity perspective and from a financial perspective? What type of 
agreement should exist between the two companies in terms of control , bearing 
in mind the contribution to total sales this new venture will attract and the 
overriding bid for Woolworths to maintain brand integrity at all costs? 
1.6 Objectives 
• To ascertain whether it feasible for Woolworths to look for new markets in 
the convenience longer trading hours stores. 
• To ascertain whether selling product from a forecourt store is sustainable 
in the long term, as people will prefer to shop full line stores. 
• To ascertain whether Engen is the best petroleum company in S.A. to 
form a joint strategic alliance with in terms of strategic fit. 
• 
1.7. Limitations to the study 
Most of the figures and statistics had to be obtained from highly sensitive and 
highly confidential documents . This put a limitation on the amount of data 
available and the form that the data was presented. In most cases only relevant 
figures were released and not whole financial feasibility studies. This has 
presented a challenge in terms of creating a strong thread of overlapping 
evidence in proving the success of the Woolworths- Engen initiative. However as 
is evident in this study, there is still overwhelming evidence to prove the success 
of this strategic alliance. Much of the evidence presented does not have the 
reports listed in this study to back up the data. Reason being due to the 
sensitivity of the information, only certain information was released and not the 
whole documents . 
1.8. Structure 
Chapter 2 talks about the theory behind competition dealing in today's business 
markets and how important it is to know what is going on around you . It goes on 
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further to discuss that in order to survive in today's cutthroat world of competition , 
a company needs to look for a competitive advantage it can hold over its 
competitors. Once such way to create a relatively cost effective and quick 
advantage is by forming an alliance with another company that is strong where 
the other company is weak. From there it discusses the fit for an alliance and the 
things to consider when forming an alliance. The possible problem areas of 
alliances are also included as well as guidelines to consider when choosing an 
alliance partner. Chapter 3 discusses how the data and information was collected 
and analyzed, including the use of an external consultant. And Chapter 4 
presents the finding and discusses the observations noted through examining the 
various forms of information. It also gives an introduction to a few facts 
necessary to understand before looking at the data. In Chapter 5, 
recommendations are made and conclusions drawn. 
1.9. Summary 
in the world of retail, companies are continually looking for ways they can create 
a competitive advantage over their competitors. One way Woolworths have tried 
to do this is by capitalizing on the growing trend among consumers for 
convenience and have formed an alliance with Engen. The purpose of this 
alliance is to test two pilot project concept stores. These stores are mini market 
"cubbys" .found within an existing Engen Quick Shop. The products Woolworths 
would sell in such a "cubby" would predominantly be the HMR's (home meal 
replacements)- an area where Woolworths currently enjoy market dominance. 
However because the Woolworths business has been built on brand integrity , the 
numbers are not enough to prove that this concept is viable for Woolworths. 
Rather brand integrity needs to be maintained and the numbers need to be good . 
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From the results, it can be seen that both criteria are met and all parties involved, 
namely Woolworths, Engen and the dealer benefit from the venture. 
Infact this is an avenue for Woolworths to attract new customers to their full line 
stores. 
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CHAPTER 2: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Strategic Competition 
In the business world today it is very rare to come across a company that has the 
monopoly over a certain industry. Rather in most instances most industries are 
ruled and governed by a oli~opoly of large corporates that wrestle their might 
against each other in order to try gain a larger segment or market share of the 
industry they are in, and in so doing allowing for great profits and a greater return 
to the companies shareholders. 
In order for a company to perform in this arena it is imperative for a company to 
understand their competit ive situation and how competitive advantage might be 
achieved (Michael Porter, 1980). 
In order to achieve this business' need to have an effective strategy. According to 
Porter, " the aims of a firm's strategy are to decide its goals and the means by 
which they can be achieved". In deciding these goals and means, managers 
must take into account internal factors such as the companies' skills, resources 
and values , and external factors, including opportunities and threats in the 
business and industry environment. Porter (1997) argues that a business without 
a clear strategy would have no basis on which to integrate its activities and 
achieve consistency between its various functions and units. 
Porter (1997)puts the strategic business decisions of the individual firms in the 
context of economic forces. These forces are derived from the industry within the 
company operates or from even further- the business environment as a whole. 
These forces affect companies' costs, the prices it can charge and its sales and 
profits. Many if not all of these factors or forces affect all of the competitors in an 
industry and limit the average profitability within it. The focus on an individual 
company strategy is therefore how to achieve and sustain above average 
retums- plainer said , "how to bend the forces of competition in its favour". 
In order to understand the threats and opportunities in a industry, it is essential to 
be clear about its scope, the forces that drive competition within it, its potential for 
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profitability and how all these are changing. Porter (1997) proposes a "structural 
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Figure 2.1: Forces Driving Industry Competi tion 
Bargaining power 
buyers 
in so doing derive a competitive strategy, which would be constantly revisited , so 
as to minimize the threats and maximize the opportunities in the industrial arena 
within which they operate. 
Further evidence for strengthening the argument that companies need to derive a 
competitive strategy is once again given by Michael Porter (1997). In today's 
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business world, Porter(1997) believes that there are 3 main misconceptions, 
which in recent times has led companies to not focus on competitive strategy in 
its entirety. These include a "new dogma" based on the belief that competitors 
can quickly replicate any market position. Competitive advantage is therefore 
only temporary. Such beliefs he contends , lead companies down the route to 
mutually destructive competition . The second is that the search for operational 
effectiveness has spawned many management techn iques, like outsourcing, 
TQM and re-engineering . As a result, "bit by bit almost imperceptibly, 
management tools have taken the place of strategy." Thus, " the root of the 
problem is the failure to distinguish between operational effectiveness and 
strategy." Operational effectiveness involves doing similar activities better than 
competitors . Strategic positioning on the other hand involves performing different 
activities or doing the same thing but in different ways. Porter does not dispute 
the value of operational effectiveness. Infact he states that constant improvement 
in this area is critical for achieving superior profitability. His contention is that few 
companies can compete successfully over any length of time on the basis of 
operational effectiveness. And he states two reasons for this; firstly "best 
practice" now spreads quickly because can imitate management techniques. This 
has been accelerated and reinforced by consultants who working across the 
industry employ the same techniques across companies. And secondly 
"competit ive convergence"- strategies converge as rivals benchmark the same 
companies , imitate each other's improvements and increasingly outsource the 
same activities (often to the same third parties). Porter(1997) warns that this last 
approach tends down a road of a series of races down identical paths that no 
one can win . 
The third is that after a decade of restructuring and cost -cutting, many 
companies are tuming their attention to growth . Too often, efforts to grow blur 
uniqueness, create compromises, reduce fit and ultimately undermine 
competitive advantage . In fact the growth imperative is hazardous to strategy. 
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Strategy is concerned with defining and then communicating the companies' 
unique position, making trade offs and forging fit among activities. 
According to Porter(1997), companies can only outperform competitors if they 
can establish a sustainable difference. This difference should enable the 
company to offer greater value for customer or to offer the same value at a 
cheaper cost, or both. The differences between companies can be attributable to 
the different activities that companies perform or go through which ultimately 
adds up to the costs incurred as well as the value delivered. Thus in broad terms 
"activities then are the basic units of competitive advantage. 
Competitive strategy is about being different. It requires a choice to either 
perform the same activities and competitors but do them differently or perform a 
different set of activities in its entirety. This seems to be the only way of offering a 
"unique mix of value". If a company does not set out to do this then the 
companies ' strategy "is nothing more than a marketing slogan that will not 
withstand competition". 
So far from the literature we can conclude that in order for a company to be 
successful it needs to have a strong competitive strategy in place. This 
competitive strategy should include a combination of being different of offering 
seNices of products that differ from the competit ion or both. The key being in the 
difference. Companies aim to handle competitive forces successfully, to achieve 
superior profits and to establish a position that is defendable in the long run. 
Porter lists three "generic strategies" that a company could use. 
1. Overall cost leadership- delivering acceptable quality so as to merit at 
least average prices but at the lowest cost. 
2. Differentiation- seNing customer needs uniquely so as to merit premium 
prices by selecting added cost in areas producing high added value. 
3. Focus- selecting a limited target market in terms of customer group, 
product range , geography, or vertical integration . Competitive advantage 
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comes from serving the selected market more efficiently or effectively or 
both. 
Porter argues that companies are most likely to succeed if they focus on one 
of these generic strategies as each strategy require different capabilities and 
are supported by different organization structures and culture. Bearing this all 
in mind Porter wams, "that competitive advantage is ultimately gained through 
a firms activities , not through devising strategic goals." 
What does it take to build a sustainable strategic position? Porter argues forcibly 
that rather than extend a strategic position, companies should deepen it. Become 
more distinctive, tighten the fit and improve communication with customers who 
should value what is offered. It is no answer to chase "easy" growth by adding 
new products or services without adequate strategic screening or targeting new 
customers and markets where the company has little to offer. Instead managers 
should find where and how the existing set of activities could offer things that 
"rivals would find impossible or costly to match". 
2.2 Strategic Alliances 
On such way that a company can achieve a competitive advantage or create a 
difference from its competition is by creating a strategic alliance with another 
company. Broadly defined, a strategic alliance is any relationship between 
companies involving a sharing of common destinies. Basically it is an agreement 
between two or more partners to share knowledge or resources , which could be 
beneficial to all parties involved (Vyas, Shelbum and Rogers, 1995). Murray and 
Mahon (1993) provide a stronger definition- a strategic alliance is a coalition of 
two or more organizations to achieve strategically significant goals and objectives 
that are mutually beneficial. "Mutually beneficial " does not however imply 
equality of benefits, but does signify that all parties to the alliance receive benefit 
from it in proportion to contributions made. 
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Strategic alliances can be either very simple or very complex. They could simply 
involve the sharing of marketing resources and/or technology, or in contrast 
involve several companies across several continents. These companies might in 
tum be linked with other organizations in separate alliances. This giving the net 
result of a maze of intertwined companies, which may be competing with each 
other in several product areas. However each alliance is unique (or in some 
instances joint venture), like a fingerprint and there can be no exact prescription 
for success (Antidote, 1997). 
As a result of the maturation of several trends of the 1980's- intensified foreign 
competition, shortened production cycles , soaring capital investment costs , and 
the ever growing demand for new technologies- alliances have become an 
attractive strategy (Vyas et aI1995) . 
Alliances are forged along a variety of dimensions. Looking at these alliances 
along these dimensions helps understand the motivation behind this trend and 
help look at a few factors critical to their success. 
Alliances can take place inter or intra industry. The companies wanting to protect 
their 'turf' in and industry usually motivate Intra industry alliances. As was the 
case where three US auto makers formed an alliance to develop an efficient 
electric battery for an electric car so as to combat the threat of foreign (Japanese 
or European) competition and prevent the loss of US market share to imports, 
(Shan, 1990) brought about by policy change in the US where a certain 
percentage of cars in the state of Califomia had to be pollution free by the year 
2000. 
Intra- industry alliances are usually motivated by a pooling of expertise to create 
synergies. Such as the case between the Dupont (chemical giant)/Merck 
(pharmaceutical giant) alliance. Merck wanted to speed up the costly process of 
bringing products to market and Dupont wanted to establish itself as a player in 
the pharmaceutical market. Merck brought its market rights to certain products 
and established skills in bringing products to commercial fruition , while Dupont 
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brought its productive discovery capabilities along with imaging- agent's business 
experience into the alliance (Huston, 1991). 
Area of alliance is also important, as many companies have found great 
advantage in forming alliances with companies operating in different countries 
such as the case of the US automakers forming alliances with foreign 
manufactures. This has allowed for the blunting of foreign competition into their 
local markets (Hamil , Doz and Prahalad , 1989). 
In some instances alliances are built of relationships or better-said relationship 
constitutes the next dimension of strategic alliances. In this instance the alliance 
is often between a company and its supplier. This is usually brought about 
because the supplier is a known quantity for the company, with the relationship 
facilitating terms of agreement, resulting in a high level of trust built on past 
business transactions. An example of comes from the computer hardware 
industry. Intel Corp. (USA) and NMB Semiconductor Co. (Japan) have supplied 
each other for many years with a variety of electronic items. However it was only 
once they teamed up to build a semiconductor foundry in Japan that these 
companies really boomed. Intel had an assured source of high quality memory 
chips and NMB had access to Intel's world wide sales and marketing network, 
and area where they had previously been weak (Kuhn, 1989). 
The influence of market related factors and technology also motivate these 
alliances. Factors that determine the nature of these alliances include: 
distribution channels (going around entry barriers); synergy (to pool resources, 
increase efficiency, share expertise, reduce cost, increase market share, and 
become more competitive) and sourcing raw materials (Lapedus, 1993; Valigra , 
1991 ). 
One lesson that companies everywhere are learning is that no one company is 
big and strong enough to do everything on their own. Companies form alliances 
to allow them to build up in some of the areas mentioned above where they are 
currently not that strong- exposing them to competition or competitors . In so 
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doing - allowing the companies a relatively quick and cost effective method of 
bridging that gap. E.g. Caterpillar Inc. (USA) and Mitsubishi (Japan) have 
decided to combine their production of forklift trucks and in so doing expect to 
benefit from joining forces rather than compete against each other for market 
share. 
This move will bump them up to the number three spot of forklift producers in the 
world (Capon and Glazer, 1987; Dambrot, 1990; Gross and Neuman, 1989). 
Linked to this some alliances are driven by the state of technology. What often 
happens is either recently matured technology (and available for application) or 
technology that is in its embryonic state (needing additional R&D) form the basis 
of strategic alliances. Companies wanting to create an immediate competitive 
advantage will seek alliances in new but readily available technologies-
commonly called technology transfer, while those who want to remain at the 
cutting edge of technology and plan for long term growth tend to form alliances 
with companies whose technology is in the embryonic stage. 
An example of technology transfer is the booming market of GPS (global 
positioning system) hand held instruments. The technology was developed for 
the military, but has been exploited by the commercial market for civilian use 
(Kanter, 1990; kogut, 1991 ; Pisano 1990). 
An example of companies forming alliances to make use of technology in its 
embryonic stage is most commonly seen in the computer industry and the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
According to Vyas et al 1995, fusion of technologies is the last dimension 
considered in the formation of strategic alliances. One of the partners may 
contribute the specific knowledge of a process (assembly, miniaturization, 
coating etc), which is critical to gain competitive advantage or to even create the 
final product. 
The alliance between Smith Kline (USA) and Kubota (Japan) is a case in point. 
Kubota , Japans largest producer of agricultural machinery, shipped in 1988 from 
a new facility its first mini-supercomputer, one of the most advanced in the world. 
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The design chips were all American. Kubota used its superb assembly know-how 
to produce a high quality product (Kodama, 1992; Kogut, 1988). 
As all trends point toward cooperation as a fundamental growing force in 
business, the world has never been so interdependent as it is now. In the past 
decade the number of new business alliances has about doubled each year, and 
this trend seems set to accelerate in the future (Lapedus, 1991). 
In order for strategic alliances to be successful it may be necessary to institute a 
few changes within a company. Management style is one such change. Table 2.1 
gives a clear comparison between traditional management ways and a new form 
of management style required to run a company involved in strategiC alliances. 
Govemment can play apart by reassessing its tax and anti-trust laws to facilitate 
co-operative ventures. Japanese and South Korean governments have taken a 
lead in such facilitating efforts . Through the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) , trade missions representing selected product areas travel the world 
seeking new partnerships. The South Korean government plans to set up a $10 
million fund to expand efforts for industrial links with US companies . The Trade, 
Industry and Energy Ministry has tapped two business groups, the Korean 
Foreign Traders Association and the Federation Of Korean Industries to raise 
cash for the funds over five years (Wall Street Journal, 1993). 
Cultural differences often create dilemmas when it comes to ensuring the 
success of strategiC alliances, especially between Asian and Western 
companies . For example, Asian companies place their employees interests 
ahead of the shareholder's interests, while western companies place their 
shareholders interests above all else. Such differences can cause serious conflict 
over investment and dividend decisions. Language barriers can add to the 
frustration , although English is becoming a common intemationallanguage. In 
the end however management learning is the key to lowering cultural barriers . 
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Vyas et al (1995) came up with a Strategic Alliance Model (Fig 2.2) , which 
identifies the steps and variables involved in the working of a strategic alliance. 
According to the model, the first step in developing the strategic alliance is to 
scan the environment for opportunities. This includes the company's own SWOT 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis. 
A clear understanding of its strengths and opportunities, allows the firm to set its 
short 
and long term objectives , while the analysis of weaknesses and threats provides 
direction to look for allowances. These may include competitors, suppliers or 
other companies, which could provide the needed strengths. These companies 
constitute the group with alliance potential (GWAP). 
The Model is broken up into segments and give a clear path how a company 
should go about a strategic alliance. 
The critical path as shown in the mode is given by SWOT Analysis to Goal 
compatibility to Barriers to Success the final net result a Successful Strategic 
Alliance. 
Traditional style 
Total control over resources to achieve objectives 
Enterprise structure: "closed system" 
Conflict resolved through hierarchy when other means fail 
Corporate culture: 
Success based on competition 
Emphasis on secrecy of operation 
Focus on generating internal resources/ know-
howltechnologies to maintain/ create competitive 
advantage 
"Not invented here" (NIH) syndrome common weakness 
Internal stereotypes "us-they" at various levels of workforce 
may persist 
Enterprise structure of "closed" may lead to workforce 
behaviour such as "turf protection", accepting status quo, 
etc. 
Value/importance of good communication is not obvious 
because of functional organisation 
Fear of failure 
Alliance often viewed as a threat (reduced control/power, 
loss of job, hence resisted or at worse rejected 
Slow to react to changes 
Short-term perspective : to reduce cost, avoid investment 
and move manufacturing to offshore where labour cost is 
low 
No specific programs to seek out alliances and make them 
successful 
Table 2.1. Comparison of traditional management style 
versus New Style. 
New style 
Shared/ distributed control 
"Open system" 
Absence of such a "hierarchy" in the alliance. 
Heavy dependence on negotiation skills 
Success based on cooperation. Competitors regarded as 
potential strategic resources 
Need for sharing of information with partners 
Using alliances as a strategic leverage to procure 
resources to maintain/ create competitive advantage 
NIH discouraged. Identifies need for new mind set. 
Encourages search for better ideas beyond corporate 
boundaries 
Such stereotypes are discouraged with specific actions 
such as training, open communications, team-building 
efforts at all levels of workforce 
Rethinking , relearning, adopting new ideas, 
experi mentation to do better to avoid the trap of 
yesterday's wisdom 
Value of formal and informal communications is stressed. 
Cross-functional approach to management builds collective 
understanding 
Failure tolerated and expected to lead to new insights 
Alliance viewed as a strategic tool 
Permits rapid and flexible response to changes 
Long-term view: develop long-term objective for gaining 
access to newly acquired capabilities 
Specific programmes to broaden the experience and 
education of the workplace. Mutual learning and mutual 
dependence encouraged through formal training and 
informal networking. 
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The company should perform similar SWOT analyses for its major GWAP firms 
to help negotiate the strategic alliances. 
Goal compatibility: 
.. .f-
SWOT short-term and long-
analysis term amount alliance I Barriers to success I 
Synergy among partners : • Failure to 
r ... one is strong where the f- understand 
Scanning the 
.. 





opportunities -. managemen 
A~ 
t (table 1) 
• Failure to Value chain: clear learn and 
understanding of what 
~ understand value each partners will cultural 
bring to the alliance differences 
SWOT 
Lack of iron-analysis of • 
GWAP firms clad 
(external) commitment 
to succeed Balancing contributions of 
partners in product 
~ .. development, 
manufacturing and 
marketing 
Figure 2.2. Dimensions of strategic alliances 
~ 
The model identifies four critical issues in order for the alliance to be a success: 
1. Goal compatibility ; short term and long term among alliance partners. 
Without such compatibility, the alliance partners may pull in different 
directions 
2. Synergy among partners; one is strong where the other is weak. This is 





efficient, effective and as a result much more competitive compared to 
each alliance partner performing the similar task individually. 
3. Value chain ; clear understanding of what value each partner will bring to 
the alliance is the foundation on which trust and relationships are built for 
future success. 
4. Balancing contributions of partners in the areas of product development, 
manufacturing, and marketing are necessary so that no one partner 
dominates the alliance. Absence of such a balance result in the take over 
of the weaker partner by the dominant firm or a short-term relationship , 
usually resulting in breaking the alliance without achieving its full potential. 
Vyas (1995) go on to state that there also tend to be three major generic barriers 
to successful strategic alliances. These include: 
1. Lack of total commitment to succeed. Often the individuals who originally 
negotiated or implemented the initial alliance agreement may change due 
to promotions, transfers, retirement or terminations. Continuity of total 
commitment for the alliance is needed at all levels in the organization 
without which the alliance will fail t reach its full potential. 
2. Failure to understand and leam the cultural differences. Not only do the 
cultural differences exist among intemational firms seeking to form 
alliances, but also corporate cultures may be different among firms from 
the same country . Flexibility and leaming are the greatest tools in 
overcoming this barrier. 
3. The failure to understand and adapt to "new style" management as 
detailed in Table1 . The adaptation of a new style of management requires 
a change in corporate culture, which must be initiated and nurtured from 
the top . 
Although many authors have written about the motives for forming alliances 
(Devlin and Bleakley, 1988; Murray and Mahon, 1993; Porter and Fuller, 1986; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), Lorange et al (1992) find that when it comes to 
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retail there are four generic motives for forming alliances: as a defense; to catch 
up; to remain or to restructure. Murray and Mahon (1993) believe that alliances in 
retail occur in response to two underlying motivations: a "defensive" instinct to 
survive or an "offensive" desire to achieve competitive advantage. 
In summary, objectives for forming alliances can be divided into two main groups. 
Namely, alliances that are used as an efficient way to expand strategic 
capabilities, and those used as a means of market control by reducing 
competition. 
Thus for retail , alliances in this sector could be classes as competitive alliances. 
This is because the role of the alliance is primarily strategic in focus and the role 
of the alliance is to increase members' effectiveness in the market. This would be 
one of the key driving motivating factors in Woolworth's decision to search for a 
strategic alliance partner. 
In addition to considering the joint venture consumer products companies that 
should perform well through a recession are those with strong retail partnerships, 
leading brands, relevant innovation, resources to support those brands and lean 
cost structures (Woolworth's have the majority of these). Those companies that 
will succeed will be able to maintain and grow as retailers expand, at the 
expense of weaker brands (Lynch 2002) or as a result of a move into new 
markets. 
In this modem age, with our interdependence growing towards a unified market, 
building stronger domestic and international business is a commercial necessity. 
The trend toward strategic alliance is clear; it is not a passing fad. Deregulation , 
the emergence of regional trading blocs , the ease of technology transfer, and the 
internationalization of markets have prompted firms to look at each other in a 
different light- as allies rather that adversaries. 
When valuing a project the Net present value of that project is often calculated to 
ascertain the present day value that the project will add . The NPV is calculated at 
the interest rate the company expects/need to get back on the project to make it 
viable . NPV is a good method to use as it takes into consideration the time value 
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of money (Amold 1998). Intemal rate of retum is also a popular method as it is 
easy to understand. Both methods should more or less give the same answer. 
Amold , 1998 lists the pros and cons of using each method . 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample and Sampling Technique 
The sampling frame will be the financial statements for the last year for the two 
pilot projects currently up and running in Cape town- namely the site in Orange 
Street and the sight in Meadow ridge. The sampling frame used to measure the 
quantitative variables took the form of those customers stopping at the forecourt . 
The size of this population was 84. This population was sampled on the actual 
forecourt site within the store, once they had made a purchase so as to account 
for the "Hawthom Effect". 
3.2 Design and Analytical Techniques 
The research design has taken the form of a case study. There will be no control 
group and the qualitative, and quantitative variables will be sampled at a specific 
point in time (the qualitative by means of an experience survey) . The quantitative 
variables will be analyzed using financial indicators such as Net Present Value 
(NPV) and Internal rate of Retum (IRR) over a fixed period of time. There will be 
two approaches to the information, 1. From a Woolworths approach 2. From an 
Engen approach. 
3.3 Feasibility 
Data to be collected for the feasibility study will be via a semi- structured 
questionnaire, through an interview. An outside consultant will conduct the 
interview. The study is a cross sectional study with the candidates being 
interviewed systematically. The researcher being independent and unbiased will 
not be able to manipulate the variables. The above applies to the collection of 
qualitative data. The quantitative data will be collected via the pilot projects 
financial figures for every month since initiation. The quantitative results For 
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Woolworths will be based off a proposed NPV and IRR model with projected 
sales vs. Actual sales once average sales data has been collected . From an 
Engen perspective the Quantitative and qualitative merge in a feasibility study. 
Sustain ability will be based on results prior to the initiative, and there after 
monitored on a monthly basis. Sustainability will measure both inter and intra -
business units.eg. Both food shop and petrol sales. 
3.4Sustainability 
The Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return will be calculated using 
formula found in the International Management textbook. Figures used for these 
Equations will come from company Financial Statements and from the financial 
statements of the two pilot projects. 
Data to be collected on which petroleum company to go in with and how best to 
structure the control will come from secondary data. This data will be made up of 
data from the A. C Nielson Report, and company documents. Secondary data will 
also be collected from company archives and structure reports , as well as post 
implementation reviews. This data has been presented in the background to the 
case study. 
3.5 Data Analysis Techniques 
Data obtained from the feasibility will be analyzed using parametric techniques. 
Quantitative data will be analyzed using financial formulae based on NPV and 
IRR. Data collected from AC Nielson (and partnership) will be analyzed using 
parametric techniques. 
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CHAPTER 4 OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS 
4.1. Introduction 
The concept of having a±. 11 m2 Woolworths mini market "cubby" integrated as 
part of the ±. 50/60 m2 quick shop has proved extremely viable for the two 
partners involved. The "cubbys" offer includes the HMR's and take away 
convenience food . It also includes those items often forgotten e.g. the meat for a 
braai , or salad stuff or even pudding . The core fundamental behind the range that 
the shop carries is convenience. This obviously also extends into the convenient 
shopping hours. From looking at the peak hours of trade, it was seen that the two 
stores had slightly different peak trading hours due to the locality they find 
themselves in . Orange Street, which is situated in town has peak trading hours 
around 5-6pm. While Meadowridge which is situated in near Constantia in a 
residential suburb has peak trading hours from 5:30 pm to 7:30 pm. Both stores 
have a spike in sales over the lunch time period, with Orange Street selling more 
than double what Meadowridge sells over lunch. (see Appendix G). All site 
identification has occurred between or has been cited by Woolworths and Engen 
HO. 
Other sites selected for future development include: 
Durban 
Lagoon Service Station 




Athlone RD, Durban North 
Rinaldo RD, Glen Hills 
Hendrick Verwoerd Drive 







William Nicol, Fourways 
Peter Place, Bryanston 
OF Malan Drive, Blackheath 
Andries pretorius St, Edenvale 
Role out plans are dependant on the success of the pilot projects and the 
confidence in the maintenance of brand integrity by the dealer. 
This also applies to the dealer selection and all the Capex for construction of a 
site suitable for a Woolworths-Engen initiative is picked up 100% by Engen. HO. 
Capex for the equipment needed in these stores is picked up by the dealer. 
The pricing of the good sold in these stores has been kept the same as the 
prices in the Woolworths full line stores so as to not to disrupt customers 
expectations when they shop the full stores 
Currently these mini-markets are run by the dealer and his staff that have had 
limited exposure to Woolworths and their protocols. This obviously being a 
concern for Woolworths and their brand integrity. However documents have 
recently been completed which list clearly defined controls necessary to protect 
the Woolworths customer experience and these include: 
• Hygiene disciplines 
• Sell-by disCiplines 
• Cold chain disciplines 
• Quality control disciplines 
• Return pol icy 
• Tilling service and procedures 
• Customer care 
These control documents are in the process of being handed over to the Engen 
body and the Engen dealers. 
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The buying, selling and procurement IT systems are currently Engen systems, 
which extract the information to provide Woolworths the sales and waste figures 
on a daily basis via the web from the dealer. All financial information is web 
enabled allowing Woolworths to better understand their customer buying 
patterns. All IT systems and set up has to comply with the minimum 
specifications set out by Woolworths. 
4.2. Findings 
The Original feasibility of the Woolworths- Engen initiative (the two pilot project 
stores within an Engen forecourt store) was based on the following calculations 
produced 1 month prior to the opening of the first pilot store September 2000 
These calculations include financials for all costs of the business from Capex 
costs to commission and consultancy costs and will be discussed later in this 
document. From these findings the Net Present Value and the Internal Rate of 
Return have been calculated. This is a Woolworths generated table and reflects 
all the considerations from a Woolworths perspective 














ssumption intro ofWW perol card/costs fo r E ngen 
L ife ex pectancy of the quickshop is 5 yrs 
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
8.00% 700% 7 00% 6.00% 
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- Average week ly sale R70,OO03,640,000 3,93 1,200 4,206,384 4,500,83 1 4,770 ,881 
- Sales Excl. V A T 11 %3,279,279 3,541,622 3,789,535 4,054,803 4,298,091 
- Waste 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 
- Shrinkage 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum Sales 3,279,279 3,54 1,622 3,789,535 4,054,803 4,298,091 
Cost of Sales 32.00% 2,229,910 2,408,303 2,576,884 2,757 ,266 2,922 ,702 
Revenue 
- Commission (PM) 10.15% 226,336 244,443 26 1,554 279,862 296,654 
- Contribution to promotion 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 
- Supplier rebate 1.00% 36,400 39,3 12 42,064 45,008 47,709 
- Supplier marketing al10wance 0.25% 5,575 6,021 6,442 6 ,893 7,307 
Total Revenue 7.37% 268,31 1 289 ,775 310,060 33 1,764 35 1,670 
Operating Expenses 
Intl ation 8.00% 700% 600% 600% 
- Travel Budget Fixed costs -4,444 -4,800 -5,135 -5,444 -5,770 
- People costs Fixed costs -33 ,500 -36, 180 -38,7 13 -41,035 -43,497 
- Marketing cost Fixed costs -1,777 -1 ,919 -2,054 -2 ,177 -2,307 
- Replacement visuals Fixed costs -5,000 -5,400 -5,778 -6,125 -6 ,492 
- Stock loss (shorts & overs) 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 
- Audit Costs Fixed costs -8,000 -8,640 -9,245 -9,799 - 10,387 
- Swel l allowance - stock damages 0.05% -1,1 15 -1 ,204 -1 ,288 -1 ,366 -1,448 
- Debtors Book Costs Settlement 0.25% -5,575 -6,021 -6,442 -6,893 -7,307 
o o o o o 
Total Expenses -59,4 11 -64 ,164 -68,655 -72 ,839 -77 ,209 
Profit Before Tax 208,900 225 ,6 12 24 1,405 258 ,925 274,46 1 
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Taxation 30 .00% -62,670 -67 ,684 -72,42 1 -77 ,678 -82,338 
Net Profit 146,230 157,928 168,983 181,248 192,122 
Return on Sales % (After Tax) 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.87% 5.87% 
Sales Transfer 8.00% -262,342 -283 ,330 -303 ,163 -324,384 -343 ,847 
Margin 750% -19676 -2 1250 -22737 -24329 -25789 
Adj usted Net Profit 126554 136679 146246 1569 19 166334 
Ad,iusted ROS % (After Tax) 5.07% 5.07% 5.07% 5.08% 5.08% 
Note: 
Sales = cost o f sales plus revenue 
Set up costs accounted for in cash flow only 
Discounted Cash Flow (NPV) R478,971.37 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
IRR 592.74 % 704.87% 717.57% 719.18% 719.39% 
Cash Flow - 17,500 121 ,230 157,928 168,983 181,248 192, 122 
Cost of Cap ital 18% 
EPS 912000000 0.00016 0.000 17 0.0001 9 0.000 20 0.00021 
Table 4.2 uses the same costing structure but differs in the spreadsheet above 
as in the sales calculation, the actual sales as per last week have been inputted 
to show a real life analysis of how from a Woolworths perspective, the initiative is 
currently tracking. Note in both tables a relatively low inflation rate, reflective of 
the actual economy. 
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Table 4.2. Sales based at Current Scenario to ascertain current IRR and 
N PV .of project. 
Capex Comment 
- Foods 0 Assumption intro ofWW perol card/costs for Engen 
- Other 0 Life expectancy of the quickshop is 5 yrs 
Total Capex 0 
Set Up Cost 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Sales 
- Inflation 8.00% 7.00% 7.00% 6.00% 
- Average weekly sale R150,000 7,800,000 8,424,000 9,013,680 9,644,638 10,223,316 
- Sales Excl. VAT 11% 6,842,105 7,389,474 7,906,737 8,460,208 8,967,821 
- Waste 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 
- Shrinkage 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum Sales 6,842,105 7,389,474 7 ,906,737 8,460,208 8,967,821 
Cost of Sales 32.00% 4,652,632 5,024,842 5,376,581 5,752,942 6,098,118 
Revenue 
- Commision 1 10.15% 472,242 510,021 545 ,723 583 ,924 618,959 
- Contribution to promotion 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 
- Supplier rebate 1.00% 78,000 84,240 90,137 96 ,446 102,233 
- Supplier marketing allowance 0.25% 11 ,632 12,562 13 ,441 14,382 15,245 
Total Revenue 7.20% 561,874 606,824 649,301 694,752 736,437 
Operating Expenses 
Inflation 8.00% 7.00% 6.00% 6 .00% 
- Travel Budget 0 0 0 0 0 
- Greg Smith Fixed costs -200,000 -216,000 -231 ,120 -244 ,987 -259,686 
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Buyer Fixed costs 0 0 0 0 
- Finance/Administration Fixed costs -18,000 -19,440 -20,801 -22,049 
- Stock loss (shorts & avers) 2.00% -136,842 -147,789 -158,135 -167,623 
- Regional mgt Fixed costs 0 0 0 0 
- Support infrastructure Fixed costs 0 0 0 0 
- Debtors Book Costs ? 
Fixed costs 0 0 0 0 
Total Expenses -354,842 -383,229 -410 ,056 -434 ,659 
Profit Before Tax 207,032 223,594 239,246 260,093 
Taxation 30.00% -62,109 -67,078 -71,774 -78,028 
Net Profit 144,922 156,516 167,472 182,065 
Return on Sales % (After Tax) 2.78% 2.78% 2.78% 2.82% 
Note: 
Sales = cost of sales plus revenue 
Set up costs accounted for in cash flow only 
Discounted Cash Flow R515,415.96 
Year 1 Year2 Year3 Year 4 
IRR 
Cash Flow o 144,922 156,516 167,472 182,065 
Cost of Capital 18% 
From table 4.1 it can be seen that after all things taken into account the numbers 
say that this is an extremely viable venture. The actual numbers that have been 
inputed further backs this up ( table 4.2). Since receiving this data it has been 
learned that both stores are trading on average around the R 190 000 a week 
















years as presented above, numbers wise , prove once again the viability of this 
venture. The Actual observations of the IRR's and the NPV's are mentioned 
below. 
Because Woolworths business has not only been built on the number, but also 
on the brand ; the survey submitted by the independent consultant is weighted 
equal if not more than the numbers in determining the viability of the project. 
Table 5.3. Summarizes the findings from the independent consultant who probed 
the qualitative aspects of the initiative as well as the probe into the customer 
profile. The findings are listed per pilot store, as each store has different 
attributes, customer responses stemming from different customers. In addition in 
the table there is a general section that list general comments from the 
customers . 
Table 4 .. 3. Table showing Orange street Vs Meadowridge customer profile 
and findings: 
Orange Street Meadowridge 
• Young age profile 25-34years • Profile mature and affluent (35-
and 18-24 years 49 years) 
• High % male customers • Mostly professional , pensioners 
• Occupation: managerial, sales and entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurial • Education: std 10 (older profile) 
• Majority claim to have either a and postgraduates. 
diploma or a degree • Mostly married people with 
• Origin: majority city bowl children in primary and 
• Estimated 45 %new customers secondary school 
• Existing Woolworths shoppers • Origin: Meadowridge, 
shop at V&A and Century City kreupelbosch , Constantia 
• They shop here for • They shop here mainly for 
convenience. Quick in and out- convenience, quick in an out 
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convenience. Quick in and out- shopping. Parking not a 
one stop shop 24 hours a day problem. It is perceived as a one 
• Most customers frequent the stop shopping experience 24 
store three times a week hours a day 
• The customers love the concept; • Frequency of shop- three to five 
the whole experience is times a week 
definitely not degrading. • The customer loves the new 
Woolworths brand intact concept and is a positive 
• The till area and trained staff a shopping experience, not 
major problem-not Woolworths degrading to the brand. 
standards 
General -Orange street General -Meadowridge 
• Woolworths card critical, • Constantia shoppers do their 
customers do not want to carry daily shop here. Only 6% from 
cash Claremont 
• Parking is a problem • Woolworths card critical, 
• Customers visit the store at all customers do not like carrying 
hours because of the customer cash 
profile and nightlife in the area • Mothers buy sandwiches daily in 
• This store is constantly bust and late afternoon for children in 
customers complained that there school 
is no space for them to move • Customers complained about 
around. Space too small- table the availability of meat, but it 
too big seemed resolved 
In addition to the information provided above, the following were the main 
conclusions drawn from the survey. 
" The Woolworths section at Engen represents enormous convenience for 
Woolworths customers. It represents, the best of both worlds- convenience 
Woolworths (WW) foods at a quick convenient location." 
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" the two current locations have brought such joy and delight to customers and 
they speak so highly of these, that removing them would result in anarchy. The 
feelings were very strong in this regard." 
"However, the customer opinion confirmed that the following issues are of vital 
importance: 
• We must ensure that the Engens we choose are clean, hygienic and 
managemenU location are in line with WN principles. 
• We must continue to offer the "convenient foods" and not sell a range that 
we are unable to maintain. 
• We must improve availability 
• We must continue to keep prices the same as lour stores 0NW). Many 
customers have been introduced to WN because of their exposure in 
these stores and are "surprised at the excellent prices". 
A comment quoted from one customer, helps Woolworths to understand from a 
qualitative point of view just how viable the venture is . 
" I always though Woolworths was expensive. Now that I've realized what good 
value the prices are, I shop at the Engen and have begun shopping at 
Woolworths traditional stores." 
Although there are obviously concerns, the overriding feeling from the numbers 
and the survey conducted on customers shopping the store tend to indicate that 
this venture is extremely viable and forms part of a strong competitive advantage 
strategy that would be hard to replicate in the short term. 
4.3. Observations discussed 
Apon delving into the research, it was found that there were three role players 
that participate in this alliance, namely Woolworths, Engen Head Office (HO) and 
the Engen Dealer. Although there are three role players involved, from a high 
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level approach the Engen dealer and the Engen HO have been grouped as one. 
Thus the feasibility study has been conducted for Woolworths vs. Engen. 
Although this is the case , on the ground level, there was also work done in 
deriving a model where all role players benefited. 
To combat or try and gain the upper hand in the game of retail , Woolworths has 
come up with a strategy, which has been generically named "The Difference". 
This strategy is a competitive one and has been aimed at outperforming the 
competition in the race for market share and ultimately sales and profit. From the 
literature it can be seen that this strategy of differentiation involves serving 
customer needs uniquely so as to merit premium prices by selectively adding 
cost in areas producing high added value (Porter, 1998). This applies to all 
aspects of the business and covers all of Woolworths functions and operations , 
from food development, to financial services to new micro store design to store 
format. (Although on a trolley full of goods Woolworths is no more than between 
2 - 4% more than the competition, this from recent research conducted). 
In line with this thinking Woolworths has implemented these two trial stores (or 
"cubby" concepts within the Engen forecourt store) and has been extremely 
successful as the results reflect. In any alliance it is critical that all members 
benefit, otherwise there would be no use in forming an alliance and this is 
certainly the case . From an Engen perspective, Engen has benefited 
tremendously from this alliance. 
Each member has brought their unique strengths into the equation, which has 
resulted in a synergy, ultimately resulting in an extremely positive outcome for all 
parties concerned. Woolworths have brought their absolute dominance of HMR 
(home meal replacements, their innovative good food and strong brand following . 
Engen has brought their distribution network, its 1400 outlets in prime sites and 
their dominance in the petroleum industry (petroleum sales- 31 %share in the 
current market-Engen). 
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This alliance that has materialized between these two corporate giants has been 
born from the realization that the formal unmeasured forecourt food market is 
currently worth R46.5bn (Nielsen 2003). For Woolworths this represents a sector 
of the market that has been previously uncaptured, and for Engen, this 
represents the opportunity to gain a larger share in this market by attracting more 
customers into their stores and possibly having a spin off on their primary 
business-namely petroleum sales. The second reason that has attracted 
Woolworths to this alliance is the second half of the Woolworths food strategy, 
which is on of convenient foods. Engen has given Woolworths the tools and 
format to trial marketing their product in a 24 hour trading environment. 
If we look at the figures drawn from tables 5.1&5.2, it can be seen from a 
Woolworths quantitative pOint of view this project is extremely feasible. From the 
original scenario where sales were R70 000 a week, the net present value (NPV) 
of the project was given at R478971 .37 (the life of the project taken over 5 
years). From an internal rate of return (IRR) this scenario yielded in yr 1 
R121230, and in yr 5 R192122. These figures being highly in favour of the 
project. When we submit the actual sales scenario of on average R150 000, the 
NPV of the project comes out at R515415.96 and the IRR for yr 1 is R144922 
and for yr 5 R192989. In order for the project to be viable the net present value 
has to be has to be a positive number. From the results the NPV is hugely 
positive. 
Because it is important to Woolworths to protect their brand integrity at all costs, 
it is necessary to evaluate the qualitative date, before deciding overall if this 
project is viable. From the data collected from the customer survey, and market 
research in the trial stores: 40%of the people who shopped there did not 
previously shop in Woolworths stores, 60%believe that 24 hour shopping is very 
important, 32%shop daily at Engen Woolworths and 52% of the customers who 
shopped Orange street store were males. (According to Nielsen 70% of 
customers who shop our stores are female) . In addition customers loved the 
experience and convenience of shopping a "24hour Woolworths store" and felt 
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that this did not detract from the Woolworths brand in any way. (This being 
important as Woolworths in essence are giving Engen their product to sell , and 
rely on Engen personal to maintain protocol; necessary in protecting the brand 
integrity of Woolworths food). 
What does this all mean? In essence Woolworths have picked up a new 
customer base that are being exposed to the Woolworths Brand. In so doing 
Woolworths have created the opportunity to attract new customers into their full 
line stores. The fact that such a high percentage of customers commented on the 
importance of 24 hour trading and hence convenience highlights the 
attractiveness to entering this market. The high percentage of male customers 
once again allows for exposure of the Woolworths brand to a customer segment 
that traditionally has a low percentage of buyers. 
From An Engen perspective, the feasibility is based on both their primary and 
secondary markets, namely petroleum and shop sales. From the figures for 
Orange street store (Appendix E and F), it can be seen that the food shop sales 
went from R439667 per month prior to launch of the new store (Average 11 
months prior to December 2000) to R2203527 (March 2003) , which represents a 
500% upliftment in food store sales. The petroleum sales for the same period 
went from 526993 litres per month (2000) to 799615 litres (2002) to 795497 litres 
(2003), which represents a 51 % and 0% upliftment respectively. 
Meadow ridge performed in a similar way, (Appendix C and D) seeing an 
upliftment in sales in both their primary and secondary markets. In the food 
market, the 11-month sales average prior to the store opening (September 2001) 
went from R722758 per month (September 2003) to R1759175 (March 2003). 
This represents a 214% upliftment in sales. The petroleum sales for the same 
period went from 456012 litres per month (August 2003) to 701449 litres(March 
2002) to 730606 litres (March 2003). This represents an upliftment of 53% and 4 
% respectively. 
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Thus in both stores, the sales of both their primary and secondary markets has 
increased significantly. The number of customers through the stores also 
increased. This was measured by the comparing the number of shop 
transactions in the stores to the figures in for August 2003. In Orange Street the 
%upliftment in shop transactions was 13%, and Meadowridge showed an 
upliftment of 16% in transactions. 
The last piece of the puzzle is to ensure that all three parties in the alliance, 
namely Woolworths, Engen HO and the Dealer collectively and individually find 
the alliance profitable. From the current business model financials for the dealer 
(Appendix A)can be seen that if a product retails for R100, R70.00 is paid to the 
supplier for the product, the Woolworths wholesale buying margin equates to 
R7 .11 and the retail buying margin from the dealer is R22.89. in effect this means 
the dealer receives R22.89 before expenses. Once expenses have been 
deducted and Engen HO have deducted their R4.00 commission, the dealer is 
left with a net contribution of R3.61 . 
From a Woolworths side (Appendix 8) Woolworths receive R7.11. Once 
deducting expenses, listed as depot shrinkage, swell allowance, other cost to 
produce, debtor and procurement costs, the net contribution comes out at R3.99. 
However Woolworths require a minimum net contribution of R4.50 to cover 
corporate overheads. In order to compensate for this difference Woolworths can 
propose that the dealer pays for his goods seven days from the date of delivery 
via direct debit. In essence what this does to the figures is allow RO.81 to be 
deducted from the debtors expense, resulting in a net contribution of R4.80. 
The commission the dealer pays to Engen HO is to pay for the investment of the 
infrastructure and administration costs. The cost to build a Woolworths-Engen 
shop comes in around the R1 .6mill mark. The dealer contributes R400 000 to 
Capex, which is depreciated over five years and Engen HO pick up the remaining 
amount. Summarizing this all parties benefit from this financially . 
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4.4. Summary 
In summary, the numerical results strongly indicated that all partied benefit from 
this project, venture. However since brand integrity means so much to 
Woolworths as it forms the basis of their business, the survey conducted by the 
independent consultant was weighted more important. This was so as 
Woolworths did not want to damage their existing reputation by tarnishing their 
brand. The results from the survey, indicate that brand integrity is in place and 
that customers would literally revolt if Woolworths decided that this was not 
feasible, as this concept has brought a new level of convenience to the 
customers lives. 
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CHAPTER 5:RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the findings of this investigation, the following conclusions are drawn: 
1. In order for a company to prosper in today's economic climate it is 
imperative that the company be aware of its surroundings. One of the 
simplest methods of doing this is to conduct a SWOT analysis, which 
sums up the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that relate 
to the company. Once this has been concluded those trouble areas can be 
focuses on. 
2. A threat facing just about every company is the threat of competition. 
Competition comes in many forms and from many different sources. 
Porters Five Forces Model show us that competition is not just merely the 
companies one is in competition with, but rather that there are other forces 
such as substitutes and the collective power of large suppliers and buyers 
that can influence competition. Competition can cause loss in market 
share and ultimately loss in profits and shareholders value . 
3. One way to combat this competition is by creating a strategic competitive 
advantage. The work strategic implies that the aim of this is to gain an 
advantage over ones competitors, but also to derive a sustainable solution 
that will last longer than one trading season. One way of doing this is by 
looking to form strategic alliances with companies that are strong where 
your company is weak, or where your company has relatively little 
expertise or assets. This is the case with the Woolworths-Engen initiative. 
4. From market research customers want convenience food. This extends 
further down the line than food that can be cooked in the microwave in 
less than 5 minutes , and extend to the accessibility of this food . 
Woolworths , the market leaders in HMR's (home meal replacements) 
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have the right profile product, but traditional have traded in stores that 
keep regular office hours. Engen who have market share of the petroleum 
market, have accessible sites that trade 24 hours a day and had fairly 
recently moved into the secondary business for them- the Engen Quick 
Shop. By combining the two one arrives at a winning business formula. 
5. The strength of the Woolworths-Engen initiative is that the two members in 
the alliance have common goals - to grow their primary businesses, they 
have a synergy fit, they clearly understand the value that each member 
brings to the table and they have balanced the contribution of the partners 
in the areas of the product. And the success of this has been built on 
these foundations. 
6. The extremely positive NPV figures show that from Woolworths 
quantitatively, this venture is extremely viable. From the qualitative 
research it seems that Woolworths fears of maintaining brand integrity 
have not been founded as customer relish the shopping experience. 
However it should be noted that the introduction of the Woolworths card 
paying system in these shops are essential and will most likely attract a 
higher ACP (average customer purchase). By changing payment terms to 
seven days, Woolworths will be able to exceed their minimum net 
contribution to cover corporate overheads by reducing their risk to debtors. 
Woolworths can learn from analyzing the sales in these Woolworths -
Engen stores linked to the buying patterns of certain geographic regions 
and can incorporate this learning into some of their full line stores found in 
the same geographic location. Woolworths can also run promotions in 
these stores to attract customers to their full line stores in order to raise 
their ACP. This venture is certainly a competitive advantage as there is no 




Woolworths by strong product innovation have created a strong category 
of food, and by marketing this product in a 24 hour trading store, 
Woolworths are exposing potential customers to their brand that these 
customers would not normally shop. 
By choosing Engen as a strategic alliance, Woolworths have given their 
project the best possible chance of success, due to Engens market 
dominance and situation of their petrol station. From Engens perspective, 
the fact that they offer a strong well recognized sought after brand in their 
quick shops has been a huge competitive advantage for two reasons. 
One, Engen is offering a unique service and convenience to the 
customers that shop petroleum at their sites. Creating a draw card for 
customers to shop at Engen sites, not only those particular pilot project 
sites, but also their additional petroleum sites. The offer of Woolworths at 
an Engen site results in a return appeal for the customers to that specific 
site, evident in the increase in petroleum sales and the increase in the 
total food shop takings. The second reason is that because the 
Woolworths brand is synonymous with quality and affluence, the initiative 
tends to upgrade the status of the petroleum station, or in other words 
strengthens the brand of the petroleum station. An attraction to the 
customer to further boost this venture is the security of the location, 
especially after hours. 
In order to ensure brand integrity, Woolworths need to have trained the 
dealer and his staff in Woolworth's protocols and Woolworth 's culture. One 
possible way of doing this is by offering a program by which the Engen 
personal would attend a programme made up of two aspects. The first 
would be a series of interactive lectures laying down the foundations of 
Woolworths, and the second would be a two-week attachment for the 
people concerned in a current Woolworth's store. Woolworths could go 
one step further, by ensuring that these Woolworths-Engen sites were 
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audited one a year. Mystery shoppers could be used to ascertain if the 
correct disciplines and Woolworth's ethos were being followed. 
7. It can be noted however that there is a factor, that if not present would 
result in these ventures not being a success and that is location. 
Woolworths and Engen need to choose sites that are convenient for 
people to stop at .i.e. on the major routes in, out and around town. Within 
eyesight of peoples normal commuting routes. Linked to this there must 
be adequate parking available for customers. 
8. The two pilot projects prove that this form of strategic alliance is 
successful and beneficial to the two members concerned. As the sites role 
it, it would be recommended that the teams responsible for running this 
venture resit and rework the numbers in terms of commissions and buying 
margins to ensure that at the end of the day the benefit goes to the 
customer. That is what will ensure the sustainability of this venture. 
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Current Business Model: Financials 
Current vs Proposed Engen Business Model - WW Appendix B 
Revenue 
/WIJ Receives R7.11 
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Cri t eria: 
Re port Info : 
TRR021 
Retail Sales Category 
Site: 2ELV Meadowridge Service Centre 
From: March 2002 
Report Status: No Status Available 





_' . Sub Sales 
"lick on to expand or collapse report Cost GP GP% 
Car Wash 351 o 351 100% 
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Premium 1,398,761 




















Barcelos 57,591 22,187 
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Other 153 104 49 32.00% 
Biltong 21,556 13,828 7,728 35 .90% 
Value Added Poultry 24,008 15,599 8,409 35.00% 
Desserts 28,137 17,221 10,916 38.80% 
New Meat 5,868 4,356 1,512 25.80% 
Party Food 27,381 17,581 9,800 35.80% 
Prepared Salads 19,056 12,086 6,970 36.60% 
Take-Aways 63,962 41,009 22,953 35 .90% 
Long Life Dairy 20,225 14,346 5,879 29.10% 
Special Occasions 16,712 11,691 5,021 30.00% 
Value Added Meat 25,258 17,246 8,012 31.70% 
Salads 50,159 33,210 16,949 33.80% 
Snacks 14 8 6 42.90% 
Recipe Dishes 73,274 46,588 26,686 36.40% 
Vegetables 40,155 27,250 12,905 32.10% 
Poultry 23,839 16,676 7,153 30.00% 
Oeli 46,634 29,670 16,964 36.40% 
Butchery 7,913 6,011 1,902 24.00% 
Dairy 74,010 58,906 15,104 20.40% 
Pies and Pizza 27,776 18,182 9,594 34.50% 
Horticulture 29,176 17,125 12,051 41.30% 
Fruit 56,287 38,107 18,180 32.30% 
TOTAl.S 4,478,752 3,731,844 746,908 16.70% 
All turnover ngures are VA I exclusive untess omerwlse stateo . 
Ul::'l..LA1Mt:K : I..:Jross t-'rom calculations are oepenoent on aealers captUring me correct COSt price ana nence may not oe accurate. I..:Jross sales accuratelY re 
I ne oata In mls report IS cOlleCtea OIrectty rrom eacn I..lUICK ~nop site casea on t:ngen approvea proouct coaes. vvnere oealer speclnc cooes are useo, me sal 
MONTH ¥Tb 
Mar-02 Apr 2001 to Mar 2002 
%Con - Sales Sales Cost GP GPO/o %(00 - Sales 
100% 1,553 o 1,553 100% 100% 
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0 .00% 356 249 107 30.10% 0 .00% 
3 .20% 57,255 39,264 17,991 31.40% 1.00% 
3 .50% 64,269 42,159 22,110 34.40% 1.20% 
4 .10% 74,571 45,954 28,617 38.40% 1.40% 
0 .90% 14,731 11,080 3,651 24.80% 0.30% 
4 .00% 71,289 46,805 24,484 34.30% 1.30% 
2.80% 51,064 32,859 18,205 35.70% 0.90% 
9.40% 157,847 102,601 55,246 35.00% 2.90% 
3.00% 54,772 39,665 15,107 27.60% 1.00% 
2.50% 31,170 22,057 9,113 29.20% 0.60% 
3 .70% 66,211 45,741 20,470 30.90% 1.20% 
7.40% 128,075 85,154 42,921 33.50% 2 .30% 
0 .00% 27 16 11 40.70% 0 .00% 
10.80% 194,470 125,059 69,411 35.70% 3.50% 
5.90% 105,091 72,075 33,016 31.40% 1.90% 
3 .50% 63,523 44,517 19,006 29.90% 1.20% 
6.80% 128,384 82,120 46,264 36.00% 2 .30% 
1.20% 21,504 16,037 5,467 25.40% 0 .40% 
10.90% 196,929 158,731 38,198 19.40% 3.60% 
4 .10% 72, 514 47,708 24,806 34.20% 1.30% 
4.30% 77,647 46,016 31 ,631 40.70% 1.40% 
8.30% 165,167 113,881 51,286 31.10% 3.00% 
41,476,519 35,178,343 6,298,176 15.20% 
Tlect all transactions processeo . 





Cri t eria : 
Re port Info : 
Profit Center 
Category 
Cilck 00 to expand or collapse report 
TRR021 
Retail Sales Category 
Site: 2ELV Meadowridge Service Centre 
From: March 2003 
Report Status: No Status Available 
Number of Sites: 1 (1 Mar 2003 - 31 Mar 
2003) 
Appendix D 
Sub Sales Co~l GP GP% 
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Car Wash 562 0 562 100% 
Tyres 92 65 27 l~ . .JUU/o 
9W#: 
Premium 1,336,282 1,216,958 119,324 8 .90% 
Unleaded 1,654,133 1,505,075 149,058 9.00% 
Diesel 251,799 229,487 22,312 8 .90% 
Is~1 (:() ··:.: : :'::::::.:: : ~f!!t 
Engen 14,563 9,836 









MTN Virtual 22,476 18,675 3,801 16.90% 
Vodacom Virtual 41,964 36,269 5,695 13.60% 
Cell - C Virtual 4, 337 3,644 693 16.00% 
Telkom Virtual Voucher 18,044 16,221 1,823 10.10% 
Below the line 7,118 4,543 2,575 36.20% 
Biltong 
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19,692 12,620 7,072 35.90% 
Value Added Poultry 22,971 14,503 8,468 36.90% 
Desserts 32,095 20,118 11,977 37.30% 
New Meat 11,631 9,620 2,011 17.30% 
Party Food 21,941 14,051 7,890 36.00% 
Prepared Salads 22,246 14,088 8,158 36.70% 
Take-Aways 91 , 280 59,427 31,853 34 .90% 
Long Life Dairy 24,853 17,653 7,200 29.00% 
Special Occasions 13,376 9,430 3,946 29.50% 
Value Added Meat 26,528 18,714 7,814 29.50% 
Salads 47,899 31,725 16,174 33.80% 
Recipe Dishes 94,424 61,002 33,422 35.40% 
Vegetables 43,019 28,896 14,123 32.80% 
Poultry 23,807 18,290 5,517 23.20% 
Deli 58,082 36,785 21 ,297 36 .70% 
Butchery 7,618 6,573 1,045 13.70% 
Dairy 96,408 76,675 19,733 20.50% 
Pies and Pizza 27,413 18,141 9,272 33.80% 
Horticulture 27,843 16,553 11 ,290 40 .50% 
Fruit 60,731 40,300 20,431 33 .60% 
TOTALS 5,077,967 4,205,940 872,027 17.20% 
All turnover ngures are VA I exclusive unless omerwlse stateo. 
UJ.:::t~LAJ.Mt:1( : uross .-ront calculations are oepenaent on aealers captunng me c:orrec:t C:OSt pnc:e ana nenc:e may not ce ac:c:urate. uross sales ac:curatelY re' 
I ne oata In tnlS report IS cOlleCtea olrectly rrom eacn l.c!UICK ::>nop site casea on t:ngen approvea proaUct coaes. vvnere aea ler specific cooes are usea, tne sal 
MONTH YTD 
Mar-03 Apr 2002 to Mar 2003 
%Coo - Sales Sales Cost GP GP% %Con - Sales 
;;;t%~ili;li;~!i;iiii 
8,038 o 8,038 100% 
100% 714 461 253 35.40% 100% 
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41.20% 15,134,198 13,935,132 1,199,066 7 .90% 44.10% 
51.00% 16,699,985 15,371,155 





































2.50% 241,166 152,293 88,873 
3.00% 215,347 135,812 79,535 
4.10% 369,010 227,249 141,761 
1.50% 88,617 70,950 17,667 
2.80% 249,994 159,618 90,376 
2.90% 237,235 148,950 88,285 
11.80% 798,063 518,511 279,552 
3.20% 238,961 169,947 69,014 
1.70% 28,669 20,199 8,470 
3.40% 263,978 185,976 78,002 
6 .20% 502,071 329,854 172,217 
12.20% 994,499 649,903 344,596 
5.60% 490,473 331,483 158,990 
3 .10% 254,743 184,811 69,932 
7.50% 539,116 342,772 196,344 
1.00% 73,403 61,211 12,192 
12.50% 956,818 774,927 181,891 
3.50% 330,965 220,094 110,871 
3.60% 353,711 210,415 143,296 
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Cr iteria : 
Report Info : 
Profit Center 
Category 
Click on to expand or collap:,(' rf?port 
TRR021 
Retail Sales Category 
Site: 2ENA Oranje Service Centre 
From: March 2002 
Report Status: No Status Available 
Number of Sites: 1 (1 Mar 2002 - 31 Mar 
2002) 
Appendix E 
Sub Sales Cost GP GP% 
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Vegetables 40,402 27,522 12,880 31.90% 
Poultry 20,475 12,972 7,503 36 .60% 
Deli 45,625 28,677 16,948 37 .10% 
Butchery 10,227 8, 588 1,639 16.00% 
Dairy 65,755 50,428 15,327 23.30% 
Pies and Pizza 23,528 15,428 8,100 34.40% 
Horticulture 22,023 13, 117 8,906 40.40% 
Fruit 61,685 41,907 19,778 32 .10% 
TOTALS 5,008,42G 4,075.373 933,053 18 .60% 
1-111 turnover ngures are VJ.\ I exclusive unless otnerwlse stateo . 
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53.70% 18,126,453 16,591,371 1, 535,082 8.50% 60.70% 
41.40% 10,345,293 9,446,649 898,644 8 .70% 34.60% 























5.20% 111,912 76,745 35, 167 31 .40% 1.60% 
2 .60% 57,743 37,757 19,986 34 .60% 0 .80% 
5.90% 130,774 83,146 47,628 36.40% 1.90% 
1 .30% 26,370 21,491 4,879 18.50% 0.40% 
8.50% 179,812 140,438 39, 374 21 .90% 2 .60% 
3.00% 61 ,921 41,082 20,839 33 .70% 0.90% 
2.80% 61,996 37,662 24,334 39.30% 0.90% 
7 .90% 178,718 123,701 55,017 30.80% 2.60% 
47,986,195 40,007,415 7,978,780 16.60% 
rlee r all rrans acclons processea . 








Retail Sales Category 
Site: 2ENA Oranje Service Centre 
From: March 2003 
Report Status: No Status Available 
Number of Sites: 1 (1 Mar 2003 - 31 Mar 
2003) 
Appendix F 
..... Sub Sales 
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Biltong 35,977 23,110 12,867 35.80% 
Value Added Poultry 20,983 13,372 7,611 36 .30% 
Desserts 39,035 24,204 14,831 38 .00% 
New Meat 10,855 8,957 1,898 17.50% 
Party Food 34,386 21,712 12,674 36.90% 
Prepared Salads 30,356 19,039 11,317 37.30% 
Take-Aways 183,138 119,233 63,905 34.90% 
Long Life Dairy 35,598 24,913 10,685 30.00% 
Value Added Meat 22,476 15,756 6,720 29.90% 
Salads 55,956 36,705 19,251 34.40% 
Recipe Dishes 109,225 70,021 39,204 35.90% 
Vegetables 40,388 26,690 13,698 33.90% 
Poultry 22,182 16,374 5,808 26.20% 
Deli 44,138 27,956 16,182 36 .70% 
Butchery 7,507 6,595 912 12.10% 
Dairy 88,533 68,142 20,391 23 .00% 
Pies and Pizza 13,829 9,127 4,702 34 .00% 
Horticulture 21,530 13,016 8,514 39 .50% 
Fruit 55,611 36,730 18,881 34.00% 
TOTALS 5,807,405 4,656,762 1,150(643 19.80% 
All turnover ngures are VA I exclusive unless omerwlse StateD. 
UJ.::>~LAJ.MI:K : uross !"ront calculations are DepenDent on aealers captunng me correct COSt pnce ana nence may not oe accurate. uross sales accuratelY rene 
I ne Data In rnls report IS cOllectea DireCtlY rrom eacn I.;!UICK ;:,nop Site oaseD on t:ngen approvea proauct CODes. vvnere aealer speclrlc coaes are usea, tne sales 
MONTH ·YTD 
Mar-03 Apr 2002 to Mar 2QQJ 
























































4 .10% 391,078 246,236 144,842 37.00% 4.50% 
2.40% 225,998 141,486 84,512 37.40% 2.60% 
4 .50% 402,363 245,568 156,795 39.00% 4 .60% 
1.20% 92,291 73,627 18,664 20.20% 1.10% 
3 .90% 339,529 215,072 124,457 36 .70% 3.90% 
3.50% 330,668 206,102 124,566 37.70% 3.80% 
21 .00% 1,525,274 988,609 536,665 35 .20% 17 .60% 
4.10% 356,764 248,857 107,907 30.20% 4.10% 
2 .60% 232,040 160,035 72,005 31.00% 2.70% 
6 .40% 508,501 331,231 177,270 34.90% 5.90% 
12 .50% 1,245,071 804,279 440,792 35.40% 14.30% 
4.60% 460,960 309,932 151,028 32.80% 5.30% 
2 .50% 229,399 158,806 70,593 30 .80% 2.60% 
5.10% 428,323 269,802 158,521 37.00% 4.90% 
0.90% 83,063 70,463 12,600 15.20% 1.00% 
10.20% 796,094 615,124 180,970 22.70% 9 .20% 
1.60% 207,355 138,189 69,166 33.40% 2.40% 
2 .50% 262,125 154,518 107,607 41.10% 3.00% 
6.40% 571,505 382,861 188,644 33.00% 6.60% 
59,768,908 57,613,153 2,155,755 3.60% 
Ct all transactions processea. 
Inrormatlon IS summanzea as I...ategorylvllscellaneous·. I ne 'IVllscellaneous I"roaucts' report toy Site) liStS mese proaucts. t:ngen Will De perrormlng a Site cleanup to ensure 
